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Abstract
A recent post by Tim Maudlin to this archive (arXiv:1408.1828) was
entitled “Reply to Werner”. However, it was not clear to what text
this was supposed to be a reply. Here I briefly provide this context,
and show that Maudlin’s post is as ill-conceived as the original paper
(arXiv:1408.1826).
1 Background of this exchange
In celebration of “Fifty years of Bell’s Theorem” the Journal of Physics
A carried a special issue[1] edited by Nicolas Brunner, Otfried Gu¨hne and
Marcus Huber. The entire collection is now freely available under
http://iopscience.iop.org/1751-8121/47/42
One contribution[4], by Tim Maudlin, was entitled “What Bell did”. The
editors found it problematic because it was very polemical, and among
other things branded as a scandal that 50 years after Bell’s Theorem
anybody could summarize its content as excluding local realism. They
therefore asked me to provide a comment explaining how Maudlin’s the-
sis relates to the mainstream view, for which “excluding local realism” is
not such a bad shorthand description of Bell’s Theorem. I did write this
comment[7], but since it was part of the editorial process of the special
issue I did not immediately post it on arXiv as I normally do with all
my papers. Maudlin was then invited to reply to my comment, and even
before the special issue was out he jointly posted on arXiv both his paper
and his reply[3] under the title “Reply to Werner”. He hardly provided
any background, and with my comment not being publicly available his
submission of the reply was rather cryptic. I did get some puzzled re-
quests, and sent the missing piece to whoever wanted it. The copyright
statement I had to sign in order not to delay the publication of the special
issue did not allow me to post my comment immediately, but now that
the whole collection is available, it may be sufficient to just explain the
sequence of events. I will also take the opportunity to straighten out some
errors in Maudlin’s reply.
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2 The point of the debate
What Maudlin wants us to believe is that Bell’s Theorem has locality as
its only assumption, so that a violation of the inequalities directly proves
that Nature itself is non-local. According to Maudlin, Bell makes no
assumption of “realism” or (as I called it in my reply) of “classicality” (in
short “C”), or a hidden-variable description. This is at variance with the
reading of almost everybody else. Indeed it is hard to miss the assumption
in Bell’s paper, as he points it out quite clearly. Maudlin’s particular way
of missing it is taken straight from an article[2] in Scholarpedia, by some
other authors of the Bohmian camp. In fact the only thing he adds to
that paper is more polemics against anyone who does not overlook the
realism assumption.
There is some tradition of trying to get rid of the hidden variable
assumption in Bell’s Theorem. For example, Henry Stapp has been pur-
suing this line in several papers. In the simplest versions he was just
hiding the classicality assumption in the naive use of a logical conjunction
of statements on the outcomes of incompatible observations. This is a di-
rect petitio prinipii, and it hardly helps that the classical logic employed
was modal. I recommend the reply of Abner Shimony [6] as a starting
point to retrace this discussion from its later versions. I would agree with
Shimony that Stapp’s project is still a failure, and in some sense it can
never succeed since algebraic quantum field theory provides an example
of a theory with full relativistic signal locality and clear violations of Bell
inequalities.
The approach of Maudlin and his Bohmian friends, however, is much
more simplistic than Stapp’s. They simply ignore the classicality assump-
tion and deride anybody as an idiot who does not share their blind spot.
Howard Wiseman [8], in the special issue in which all this was exchanged,
has taken a more charitable view, explaining that the conflation of classi-
cality and locality into “local causality” in a later article of Bell makes it
suggestive to not see classicality as a separate assumption. But Wiseman,
too, is completely aware that they can be separated. Therefore, if any
kind of clarity is to be achieved in a discussion between hidden variable
theorists like Maudlin and those who have learned to do Physics without
classicality assumptions for the last 80 years, i.e., those who assume C
and those who don’t, C must be made explicit.
Whether or not assuming classicality is a good choice is not the issue
here. Therefore, at the end of the introduction of my comment I said:
“Of course, I now have to say what this C is. I can only hope to do it
well enough that Maudlin will say: ’Yes, we assume that, of course’.” His
reply shows beyond doubt that I failed. I have little hope to get through
to him with a second attempt, but can at least try to explain his confusion
to other readers. There are two issues, described in the following section.
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3 Comment on Maudlin’s Reply
3.1 Maudlin’s failed search for C
The first issue is the explanation of classicality “C”. I gave a technical def-
inition, the simplex property, directly followed by a paragraph beginning
with “How can such a technical criterion become a far reaching postu-
late?”. This paragraph was apparently completely overlooked by Maudlin,
who therefore misses in what sense I claim that the EPR and Bell argu-
ments presuppose classicality. He writes, triumphantly,
“One can search Werner’s paper high and low for this vital piece
of information and it is simply nowhere to be found. Which step
of that argument, exactly, does not go through if the state space
of the theory is not a simplex? We are given not a shred of an
indication. This is a truly remarkable circumstance. [...] about
this key, central question there is literally not a word, not a breath,
not a clue”.
That is quite poetically written, but in the time Maudlin took for writ-
ing that, a normal reader can easily just read on, and find and read and
understand the paragraph Maudlin was looking for “high and low”. I
was not hiding it. The point he thus missed in my explanation is that
any description in terms of properties, thought to pertain to the system
itself, and independent of the experimental arrangement and the choice
of subsequent measurement, presupposes C. Using classical random vari-
ables, ontic states, hidden variables, and especially conditional probabili-
ties based on those, presupposes C. And all these things are quite easy to
find in the EPR and Bell arguments. Others before me apparently have
tried to get the point across to Maudlin. From his main article we get the
passage (also cited in my comment)
I have heard an extremely distinguished physicist claim that Bell
presupposes realism when he uses the symbol λ in his derivation.
Here is how Bell characterizes the significance of λ ([1] 15): “Let
this more complete specification be effected by means of parameters
λ. It is a matter of indifference in the following whether λ denotes a
single variable or a set, or even a set of functions, and whether the
values are discrete or continuous.” There is obviously no physical
content at all in the use of the symbol λ here. Bell makes no
contentful physical supposition that can be denied.
Not only the “distinguished physicist” is trying here, Bell himself tries to
explain to his readers (and, unsuccessfully, to Maudlin) how assumption
C enters. I think Bell does that fairly well. He could have said, equiva-
lently, but in a technical language that was not his or that of his supposed
readership at the time: “Let us assume that the overall state space is a
simplex, about which we will not make any further assumptions, and de-
note its extreme points by λ”. It is the point of this passage that a very
general assumption is made, but an assumption nonetheless. Indeed it is
a crucial one, and Bell seems perfectly aware of that, even if he was not
entertaining the option of dropping it. And the assumption can be denied,
of course. Some minimal familiarity with the literature would have shown
Maudlin that it is not just crazy Werner who is doing just that. Nobody
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is forcing him to follow that move and, of course, it can and should be
discussed. But the point of his article and the source of his scorn on the
physics community (minus the few Bohmians) derives only from his own
inability or unwillingness to read the basic texts of the subject.
3.2 EPR-locality
I cited from Maudlin’s paper a passage defining “EPR-locality”. I was
aware, of course, that he uses this for a conflation of C and L, as explained
by Howard Wiseman in his contribution. So I should perhaps have seen
the risk of what would happen when I claimed Maudlin’s definition for the
operational approach. His statement, which I still find a good description
of locality (L) in operational QM, was
A physical theory is EPR-local iff according to the theory proce-
dures carried out in one region do not immediately disturb the
physical state of systems in sufficiently distant regions in any sig-
nificant way.
The tricky word here is “state”. Of course, if you take it in the sense of
a description by properties, as ’ontic’ and pertaining just to the system
by itself, you have mixed C back in, so you get that unhappy conflation.
Think of a quantum state instead, a density operator for the distant sys-
tem (B), as used to predict the probabilities for any further events. From
such further events you would anyhow have to tell that a disturbance had
happened. And indeed in the operational approach no prediction about B
changes when or if a measurement or other procedure is carried out on A.
This independence is built into the structure of quantum theory. This is
also the same as the no-signalling condition and the possibility of tracing
out system A, getting a reduced state for B, which does not change (and
so is undisturbed) whatever happens just to A.
I tried to make clear that I was not talking about the hidden variable
sort of state by bringing in the ontic-epistemic distinction. That was
perhaps another didactic mistake because this is often done inside the
hidden-variable camp, and possibly got Maudlin on a wrong track. What
apparently confused him further is the obvious fact that if you condition
on the outcome of a measurement on A, you get a modified state for B1.
That is just another way to look at correlation, but never, not even in
classical probability, can this be confused with a physical disturbance.
The state change only becomes effective when the results from the two
labs are brought together and are jointly analyzed, which can happen
centuries later. Bohmians like Maudlin tend to confuse such changes in
distributions with a change in the world, because the notions of states
and wave functions are reified, and considered as some real thing out
there. If a state change by conditioning on a remote observation were
to count as “disturbing the physical state of the system in a significant
way” then any classical probabilistic theory allowing correlations would be
not EPR-local. Attributing such a silly notion to EPR would completely
1By the way, conditional states can be used to express and analyze the EPR argument,
with C brought in explicitly as the assumption that it is possible to interpret the conditioning
in terms of filtering from a distribution of antecedent “hidden ontic states”. This is expressed
in the notion of “steering” and is further explained in my main article in the special issue.
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miss the new points raised in that paper, and could only be seen as a
deliberate insult to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. I can only hope this is
not intended by Maudlin, but then I cannot see how QM fails his criterion.
4 Summary
As Maudlin rightly points out, nobody in this debate from the times of
EPR onwards (except some parapsychologists[5]) ever claimed signalling
on mere correlations would work. Nevertheless, different consequences
have been drawn from this consensus: Operational quantum mechanics
has built it into its very structure (i.e., assuming L, hence dropping C).
Bohmian theory has chosen to stick to C which then forces the negation
of L at the level of its hidden variables. This and only this is the meaning
of the term “non-locality” in quantum mechanics.
Of course, none of this is new. Like many of my colleagues, I expect
my students to know it, and indeed many interested lay people do. No
doubt there are also many misunderstandings around, and clearing those
up is a very laudable undertaking. Unfortunately, Maudlin’s articles are
backward steps towards this goal.
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